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This paper presents a novel descriptive model for 
agency in videogames as communication. 
Literature pertaining to interactive works including 
videogames has identified the need to overcome 
dyadic perspectives of communication in such 
works. Research specifically to do with agency has 
called for agency to no longer be confused with 
freedom of action, for an integrated perspective of 
the player and the system, and for that relationship 
to be viewed as a conversation. The transactional 
model in this paper achieves this by proposing a 
nested hierarchy of levels of communication that 
operate as an implicit contract, negotiated between 
the system and the player, where the object of the 
transaction is bio-costs, effected through the 
signalling of the attainability of understandings. The 
paper describes research antecedents, a research 
agenda, the basis for the model, the model itself, 
examples of how the model can be used to 
describe videogame designs, and future research.  
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
This paper proposes multiple interconnected levels 
of communication as a theoretical model for the 
analysis of the agency of videogames. The model 
is a means of following up on certain advances in 
research related to videogames and bringing them 
together in one framework. Chief among these 
advances are overcoming a dyadic perspective 
(alternating sender-receiver roles) of 
communication, holding an integrated user-system 
perspective, and treating agency as a conversation.  
The model is an intermediate step between defining 
agency and deriving videogame design principles 
(which is mentioned as prospective future research 
in the Conclusion to this paper). The what already 
exists (as discussed in the Background section of 
this paper); the model in this paper deals with how 
agency works as communication. If the stages of 
that communication are not alternating signal and 
response (dyadic communication), then what are 
they, and how do they work? The levels in the 
model propose an answer to this question. 
2 | BACKGROUND 
A tendency to place responsibility for agency in 
playable media with either player-modelling 
techniques or artificial intelligence techniques has 
been observed and criticized in literature 
(Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum, 2010; Wardrip-Fruin et 
al., 2009; Harrell & Zhu, 2009). A related, recurring 
issue is the tendency for agency to be confused 
with player freedom. Janet Murray warns that 




have “effect, but the actions are not chosen and the 
effects are not related to the players’ intentions” 
(1997, p. 128); Harrell & Zhu warn against an “over 
amplification of users’ freedom to act however they 
want” (2009, p. 46); and Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum 
explain that “unrestricted player actions” are not 
“sufficient for meaningful play” (2010, p.14). 
Agency has been redefined by Wardrip-Fruin et al. 
(2009) and by Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum (2010) in 
ways that avoid misplacing responsibility for agency 
and misconstruing agency as player freedom. The 
redefinition in Wardrip-Fruin et al. (2009) is viewed 
by Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum as having arrived “at 
complimentary conclusions” to their own (2010, 
p.12). Both of these redefinitions carry an 
integrated perspective of the player and the 
system, where neither the player nor the system 
can be fully isolated from one another; agency does 
not fall on neither the system nor the player, but 
encompasses them both as one, and extends 
beyond them – agency is real, and, to some extent, 
independent of both system and player. Wardrip-
Fruin et al. distinguish their perspective “from 
previous presentations of agency as an audience 
experience or structural property of works” (2009, 
p. 8). Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum see “designers 
and performers” as being “in a type of conversation 
with each other, mediated by the game” (2010, p. 
14). As for agency being misconstrued as player 
freedom, Wardrip-Fruin et al. emphasize enticing 
“players to desires the game can satisfy” (2009, p. 
7), and Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum emphasize 
meaning, which shifts “the emphasis in an 
interaction away from the outcome of a choice and 
towards the intent which underlies that choice”, 
thus avoiding the construal of “agency as freedom” 
(2010, p. 14). 
An issue related to the need for an integrated 
perspective is how communication perspectives 
(e.g. semiotics) tend to be dyadic, alternating 
between signal and response – a “transmission 
model” that “breaks down” when applied to 
videogames, as noted by Upton (2018, p. 8). 
Aarseth makes a comparable criticism of 
“traditional” (1997, p. 22), “chain of signifiers” 
(1997, p. 24) models with regard to their application 
to cybertext. 
Outside of studies of the agency of playable media, 
the need for an integrated perspective is also 
present. Research on Emergent Narratives as a 
resolution to the Narrative Paradox arrived at the 
need for Purposeful Authoring (Louchart et al., 
2008), which takes into account both player and 
system. The notion of a contract of interactive 
storytelling (Young, 2002; Adams, 2006) was a way 
of circumventing the “Problem of Narrative Flow” 
(Adams, 2013, p. 96) of how to split responsibility 
for plot coherence and the quality of storytelling 
between player and the design of the system. 
An example of a perspective of videogames that is 
anchored on the system – as opposed to being 
integrated in the meaning of this paper – is the 
MDA (Mechanics, Dynamics, Aesthetics) 
framework (Hunicke et al., 2004). MDA allows 
games to be approached from both the direction of 
mechanics “at the level of data representation and 
algorithms”, or aesthetics at the level of evoking 
“emotional responses” in the player (Hunicke et al., 
2004, p. 18). However, approaches from either 
direction must always go through the intermediate 
level of dynamics, which Hunicke et al. (2004) 
explicitly equate with the system. 
An example of a perspective of videogames that is 
anchored on the player is Situational Design 
(Upton, 2018). Situational Design touches on the 
game as a system in its concepts of Situations, 
Constraints, and Moves, but is explicitly stated to 
be “a player-centric approach” (Upton, 2018, p. 6) – 
to overcome an observed tendency to abstract the 
player in most game design approaches. Upton is 
concerned with giving coverage to aspects of play, 
similar to the model proposed in this paper, but 
emphasizes concepts of playfulness and 
anticipation in meaning-making, whereas this paper 
is more concerned with agency as communication, 
and its requirement of an integrated – as opposed 
to player-centric – perspective. 
3 | BASIS FOR THE MODEL 
To deal with the issue with dyadic models of 
communication, the model in this paper draws from 
behavioural-role pragmatics (Watzlawick & Beavin, 
1967), in that overcoming the communication dyad 
requires an appropriate unit of analysis. The 
functioning of the model in this paper is drawn from 
Conversation Theory (Pask, 1976). This is a means 
for the model to delve into how the conversation of 
agency in Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum (2010) is 
carried out. Following Conversation Theory, the 
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model in this paper sees agency as a contract 
between the player and the system. Conversation 
Theory is an approach from second-order 
cybernetics, that is, from a cybernetics of 
cybernetics, or a cybernetics of observing systems 
as opposed to observed systems (Pangaro, 2002) 
– a cybernetics that deals with subjectivity where 
first-order cybernetics is concerned with control. In 
keeping with this second-order cybernetics 
approach, the unit of analysis used to build the 
model in this paper draws from the concept of bio-
cost (Dubberly et al., 2009) – which is also from 
second-order cybernetics – as to ensure 
compatibility between the unit of analysis of the 
model and the model’s functioning as a contract as 
drawn from Conversation Theory.  
The model proposed in this paper is transactional. 
Upton criticizes widespread “transactional” 
approaches to videogame design (2018, p. 8) as 
excessively focused on activity. Upton’s Situational 
Design moves away from this. As mentioned in the 
Background section of this paper, we argue Upton’s 
player-centric approach to be incompatible with our 
focus on agency as a conversation. Instead of 
moving away from a transactional approach, we 
change the object of the transaction to bio-cost to 
be consistent with the Contract-view from 
Conversation Theory. This lets our contract-model 
operate in terms of negotiating the anxiety from 
having too many or too few possibilities in 
interpretation of the system, similar to what is 
described in Carvalhais & Cardoso (2017). 
Behavioural-role pragmatics is a triadic model of 
communication, which overcomes the artificial 
“punctuation” of the communicative exchange as 
sender-sign or sender-receiver (dyadic) relation 
between participants in the exchange (Watzlawick 
& Beavin, 1967, p. 7). Watzlawick & Beavin instead 
see “any behavioral event in a sequence” as “a 
stimulus for the event which follows it, and both 
response and reinforcement to the one which 
preceded it”, with this serving “as the minimum 
complexity of any interchange” (Watzlawick & 
Beavin, 1967, p. 7). These behavioural roles are 
the unit of analysis that allows behavioural-role 
pragmatics to overcome a dyadic model of 
communication. Through its own unit of analysis, 
the model in this paper provides this for agency as 
communication in videogames – a behavioural-role 
that shifts according to the different levels of 
observation in the model.  
Conversation Theory sees the participants in a 
conversation “as part of a contract” agreeing “to 
obey the rules of the conversational language L”, 
where “the participating agent makes sure that the 
L syntax is respected” (Pask, 1976, p. 4). 
Understanding is a structural property of 
conversations, where a topic is understood and is 
concretely made understandable (becomes an 
attainable “understanding”) if that topic “is 
explained” and “can also be derived from other 
topics in the conversational domain”, inasmuch as 
these derivations are explanations of explanations, 
or a “systematic justification of an explanation” 
(Pask, 1976, p. 4). The contract-model in this paper 
sees agency as exchanges in the attainability of 
understandings, through bio-cost. 
The concept of bio-cost is meant to help “map the 
cognitive transitions that are the core value of using 
computers or any human activity” (Pangaro, 2008, 
p. 36). Bio-cost then, consists of “effort-
minimization trade-offs” (Pangaro, 2008, p. 37) in 
the context of such activities – a “second-order 
awareness of the toll that a task is taking”, which 
“becomes part of a feedback loop” that helps end-
users “estimate the bio-cost expenditure required to 
be successful” (Dubberly et al., 2009, p. 188). 
These trade-offs are involved in how “we humans 
create and evolve our goals in real-time and in 
parallel to our actions and to other goal-related 
‘mental processing’”, where “we negotiate with 
ourselves and others in attempts to lessen or 
increase some attributes of desired outcomes 
above others” (Pangaro, 2008, p. 37). Bio-costs are 
the currency of agency in videogames in the model 
in this paper. As per the model, players play by 
expending bio-costs following their hypotheses for 
what the system is like. When these hypotheses 
prove correct, the player gets a return of investment 
in bio-costs, which can then be re-invested towards 
further returns. These returns and investments are 
negotiated by the user and the system through the 
contract of agency in the model, through the 
different levels of abstraction in the model. 
4 | THE MODEL 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the model proposed in 
this paper consists of a nested hierarchy of eight 




meaning (as per Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum, 2010) 
– is collaboratively produced between levels in 
videogame play by the player and the system, 
starting at the bottom of the structure (the Controls 
level), and working its way up to the top of the 
structure (the Personal Play Narrative level). 
In Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum (2010), actions taken 
by the player in the course of interacting with the 
videogame can be seen as speech acts, and matter 
because of their illocutionary point – i.e., what they 
mean. For its part, the system also undertakes 
speech acts in how it expresses a gameworld, in 
how it provides constraints to the player’s actions, 
and what are the expectable results of those 
actions. The speech acts of the player and those of 
the system are not isolated from each other; they 
are instead derived from each other (as part of a 
conversation). Figure 1 shows eight levels of 
abstraction for this mutual commitment to meaning, 
where understandings are derived following 
Conversation Theory (Pask, 1976) between levels, 
and are used to negotiate bio-costs between the 
user and the system. 
Speech acts in the model define terms for 
exchanging promissory notes towards bio-cost 
replenishment between the player and the system 
of the videogame. The speech acts of the system 
offer play possibilities. Through her speech acts, 
the player loses interactional options by committing 
to certain possibilities and not others. Together, 
these form a process of commitment to meaning 
that produces agency. The time a player spends 
playing a videogame and keeps coming back to 
that videogame is a continual contract re-
negotiation, done for its own sake. Bio-costs are 
both what is being negotiated and the fuel that 
powers the player and the system taking part in the 
negotiations. 
The player implicitly knows that taking on bio-costs 
along certain lines will lead to a corresponding 
replenishment – or repayment – of those bio-costs 
along those same lines. Moreover, that repayment 
will carry a profit margin of heightened skills or 
improved parameters for interaction, lowering the 
toll of bio-costs in subsequent tasks, and letting the 
player take on higher and higher bio-costs as she 
moves along in playing the videogame. 
For its part, the system benefits from bio-costs due 
to uncertainty being taken away as to what the 
player might try to do next in the context of the 
videogame. This narrows down the possibilities for 
action the system has to offer, and relieves the 
system of having to be infinitely complex. Every 
time the player takes on a new bio-cost, the system 
is relieved of having to cater to some aspect of 
meaningless freedom of action. 
The benefits for the player and the system in 
negotiating bio-costs in a contract of agency match 
the views and goals of the definition of agency in 
Wardrip-Fruin et al. (2009) and in Tanenbaum & 
Tanenbaum (2010) – namely as it relates to 
overcoming the conflation of agency with freedom 
of action, and achieving an equal distribution of 
responsibility for agency between the player and 
the system. 
4.1 THE LEVELS IN THE MODEL 
In the model, following Conversation Theory (Pask, 
1976), understandings are signaled in each level, 
and become meanings in the next level. On that 
next level, the meanings inform new 
understandings, which lead to a commitment on the 
level above that, and so forth. Bio-cost is what is 
used for alternately signaling understandings and 
committing to meanings. In the model, successful 
functioning of the videogame is understood as 
meaning happening at each and every one of these 
levels; videogame design problems are understood 
as certain levels being skipped or their meaning 
being obfuscated by other levels, disrupting the 
flow of commitments. Solutions to videogame 
design problems offset such effects by tweaking the 
 
Figure 1 | The eight levels of the model in this paper. 
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construction of meaning in certain levels. Situations 
of this happening in games can be found in the 
Examples section of this paper. Play in videogames 
is defined as the time between the system creating 
a need for interactional support and the player 
running out of need for this support. This is the 
most abstract, highest level in Figure 1 – the 
Personal Play Narrative. 
As per the model in Figure 1, the player and the 
system implicitly agree on three conditions. The 
first condition is that understandings exist in the 
context of their conversation – the playing of the 
videogame. This means that the videogame is finite 
and non-arbitrary. The second condition is that the 
understandings are attainable. This means that that 
the depth and breadth of the player’s range of 
actions has assuredly been designed to be 
tractable to some degree of comfort and reliability, 
given the conditions of play. The third condition is 
conversational parsimony from both the system and 
the player. This means that no understandings go 
to waste – any understanding is valuable in 
signalling further understandings. The system can 
rely on the player not skipping ahead in the course 
of their conversation without first attaining the 
requisite understandings. The player can rely on 
the system not turning up understandings that are 
not supported by preceding understandings. 
The Controls level (bottom of Figure 1) is the terms 
for the bio-cost transactions in the videogame. 
More than simply input or commands, controls in 
this model can be understood as the letter of the 
contract – they are the most elementary form of 
signalling that there are attainable understandings. 
The controls phrase bio-costs – they are the unit of 
currency to bio-costs traded at levels above 
Controls in the model. 
The next level in Figure 1 refers to Tokens – 
objects in the gameworld that register and store 
quantities of bio-costs by changing state; they 
make those quantities available and visible by 
being placed across the gameworld in a certain 
distribution. This profile of distribution is relevant to 
defining a play aesthetic. A token in this model is 
not just any object with placement in the 
gameworld, even if this object is interactive; it 
needs to make a difference to the sale (expenses, 
returns) of bio-costs in the gamestate – otherwise 
the object counts as a prop. 
Next in Figure 1 are Verbs, which are the bio-cost 
transactions themselves – a control (terms for the 
transaction) activated on a token (quantity in the 
transaction). The player positions herself in the 
conversation – i.e., the conversation in which the 
contract is negotiated – through verbs. Verbs let 
her expend bio-costs (take on uncertainty and 
stress, employ attention, cognition, motivation), 
effect bio-cost savings, and re-invest profits. A verb 
with tweaked, strengthened power to affect the 
gameworld (e.g., powered-up, levelled-up), or 
employed with acquired skills by the player is a bio-
cost profit being re-invested. A verb that changes to 
automate a previously manually-entered sequence 
of inputs is a bio-cost saving. 
Above Verbs is Power-to-Affect-the-Gamestate 
(PAG), as the accrued sale of bio-cost transactions 
– what the player ventured and gained in playing 
the game. Controls, Tokens, and Verbs result in 
PAG. PAG is the point of wielding Controls, 
Tokens, and Verbs, and the means whereby the 
system empowers the player to play the game, and 
provides a conversational point to playing the 
game. 
Following PAG is the level of the Current 
Gamestate, for what results from all the 
transactions and signaling below. Bio-cost 
transactions keep taking place, and they actualize 
(make Current) a particular gamestate, then 
another, then another, and so forth. The Current 
Gamestate is a given point in the process of 
contract negotiation between the system and the 
player, which helps them decide how to move 
forward in the negotiation. 
The Possibility Space holds all the alternate 
potential versions for future Current Gamestates – 
where the conversation can go from a given 
Current Gamestate. This space is perceived as the 
player’s sketched-out mental model of all the 
potential bio-cost sinks and payoffs in all the 
untapped playable content in the game by that 
point in the negotiation. The player does not need 
to experience every possibility; only find one 
legitimate conversational route across the 
negotiation – a chain of commitments. 
The Rules level is what makes the Possibility 
Space finite, and therefore lets it fit in the 
conversation. The system is spared from having to 




conversation with each new topic. Without Rules, 
the player would not be able to distinguish further 
possibilities from her current gamestate, due those 
possibilities being infinite. 
The Personal Play Narrative is the player’s mental 
model of the entire negotiation process. It’s there 
from the moment the player first picks up the 
videogame, right until she drops it. These are the 
stories we tell ourselves about playing games – 
e.g., I was getting stuck, but then I saw the way 
forward; I was finding the game too hard, but then it 
occurred to me that…. In the model, these stories 
are about bio-costs and committing to meaning. 
4.2 EXAMPLES 
In this section, the model in this paper is used to 
describe game design in two different published 
commercial off-the-shelf videogame titles. For each 
title, the model is first used to describe aspects of 
the videogame’s design as potential threats to the 
maintenance of agency as a conversation. This 
means risks of the player losing herself from the 
conversation, or of holding an inaccurate mental 
model of the system which would only become 
more inaccurate with time. Next, the model is used 
to describe other aspects of each videogame which 
counteract the threat to agency. 
The first title to be examined is Fallout 2 (Interplay 
Productions, Inc., 1998). Fallout 2 (FO2) is a 
roleplaying game where the player defines a 
character by balancing a series of parameters 
previous to the gameworld becoming accessible. 
The gameworld offers problems which measure this 
balance of parameters against virtual dice rolls. 
Successfully solving problems affords the player 
the means to strengthen her character against 
more demanding, future problems. There are 
roughly three styles of problem-resolution in FO2, 
which can be described as diplomacy, subterfuge, 
and combat. Consistently succeeding with any one 
style requires sustained commitment – 
strengthening the balance of parameters towards 
one style while weakening the others in the face of 
limited opportunities to improve character-
parameters. When an attempt to solve a problem 
using the diplomacy style or the subterfuge style 
fails, the player is often forced into combat. A 
character geared towards diplomacy or subterfuge 
then incurs an opportunity-cost from having 
weakened its combat-style. This can be regarded 
as a legitimate design choice for reasons such as 
e.g. differentiating stakes between play-styles 
towards roleplaying. 
From the standpoint of the model in this paper, 
defaulting to combat in FO2 can incorrectly signal 
the nature of the system at the level of the Current 
Gamestate in the model. The player might feel that 
the system is signalling that her bio-cost investment 
in the subterfuge or diplomacy styles – the effort in 
continually interpreting the possibilities in the 
system and the anxiety of trying to make 
conversationally-relevant choices – is less valid. 
This is not necessarily the case. The character 
might be within the parameters to succeed at that 
particular subterfuge or diplomacy attempt, and the 
failure might be due to virtual dice-rolls on the part 
of the system, and could have just as well been a 
success. Even if the character was outside the 
parameters, sustaining the investment in the 
diplomacy or subterfuge styles might still yield a 
competitive character. 
In the model, the player should always evaluate her 
Power to Affect the Gamestate (PAG) against the 
Current Gamestate, and from that Current 
Gamestate derive the Possibility Space for 
subsequent play against the Rules and so forth. 
The defaulting to resolution by combat in FO2 can 
cause the player to skip the Current Gamestate and 
evaluate her PAG against the Possibility Space, as 
shown in Figure 2. In other words, she is not 
evaluating her diplomacy or subterfuge PAG 
against the actual demands of the system; she is 
looking at an incorrect Possibility Space (due to 
 
Figure 2 | Threat to agency in FO2. 
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skipping the Current Gamestate level) where all her 
future attempts at resolution default to combat. She 
will either discard her character and start over, or 
start unnecessarily investing in a combat style. 
FO2 features a Targeted Shots verb. This verb 
raises the stakes of a combat action – the player 
takes on increased chances of failure against more 
expressive effects in case of success. Using the 
verb for making a targeted shot is an alternative to 
the more standard non-targeted verb, which yields 
more consistent and less expressive results. 
Character-parameters that help success in targeted 
shots can overlap with parameters that help the 
diplomacy and subterfuge styles of resolution. 
Making the most out of the more standard, non-
targeted verb requires a different investment, more 
geared towards the combat style – e.g. being able 
to survive enemy attacks long enough to enjoy the 
consistent results of the non-targeted verb. 
From the standpoint of the model in this paper, the 
targeted shot verb remedies the threat to the 
contract of agency from defaulting to combat. This 
verb works as an insurance policy for the bio-costs 
the player has already invested and will invest in 
the future in the diplomacy style or in the 
subterfuge style. The system is signaling to the 
player that although her investment is riskier, she 
can expend more bio-costs (anxiety, having to 
evaluate things more carefully) in the targeted shot 
verb to get insurance against defaulting to combat. 
Her investment in the other styles – due to the 
overlap in parameters between targeted shots and 
the non-combat styles – can still pay off. The 
system gets an added means for explaining bio-
cost returns to the player. As seen in Figure 3, 
improved signaling at the level of verbs helps de-
emphasize PAG, which prevents it from obscuring 
the Current Gamestate, which would have made 
the player skip that level. 
The other title to be examined is Red Faction: 
Guerrilla (THQ Inc., 2009). In Red Faction: Guerrilla 
(RFG), the player learns to roam a succession of 
sandbox maps and quickly pick out and engage 
activities. The activities tend to be relatively shallow 
– the player moves in, quickly forms a plan no more 
complicated than causing as much destruction as 
possible as quickly as possible, implements it, and 
moves on. This is a steady process of accumulating 
resources and transforming the gamestate towards 
desired outcomes. Part of how the system trains 
the player in this shallow and wide attentional 
footprint is good interactional support. A map can 
be quickly pulled up which shows distribution of 
resources in the gameworld. The player can select 
a point in the map, which will create a route 
towards that point. This route appears both in 2D 
on the map and projected in 3D on the gameworld. 
The route dynamically alters to always show the 
optimal path to the destination, even if the player 
goes off-course. The player quickly grows 
accustomed to setting routes, changing her mind 
halfway, easily dismissing routes and setting new 
ones. 
Occasionally the system will insert variants into 
sandbox play in RFG. These are higher-stakes, 
moving targets, available only for a limited time. 
Instead of resources being evenly distributed 
across the gameworld to be accessed at the 
player’s leisure, the player has to drop what she is 
doing and chase down a spike in resource 
availability, or incur an opportunity cost. The variant 
play instances themselves also require more 
planning and have riskier execution compared to 
established play. The attentional footprint suddenly 
shifts from wide and shallow to narrow and deep. 
Both the standard wide and shallow footprint and its 
variant are legitimate design choices. The standard 
footprint emphasizes the spatial and simulational 
qualities of the system, while the variant prevents 
play from becoming a chore.  
 




From the standpoint of the model in this paper, the 
shift from a wide and shallow attentional footprint to 
a narrow and deep attentional footprint in RFG can 
cause a disconnect between the level of Power to 
Affect the Gamestate (PAG) and the levels below of 
Verbs, Tokens, and Controls. The player is 
accustomed from the wide and shallow footprint to 
relatively lighter investments of bio-costs in Verbs, 
Tokens, and Controls against smaller but steadier 
returns in PAG. The targets on the map are 
stationary and always available, which makes play 
more forgiving. The shift to a deep and narrow 
footprint increases the PAG to be gained in one 
instance of play, but also the loss of PAG from 
mistakes. The player feels cheated in the contract, 
and stops trusting her ability to invest bio-costs at a 
low-level. This disconnection is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
Whenever an instance of variant play emerges in 
RFG’s sandbox, the system does something that is 
seemingly counter-intuitive – it sabotages its own 
interactional support. In standard play, the player 
grows accustomed to taking the lead in handling 
the means of interactional support, laying down 
routes and selecting objectives at her leisure, 
without any consequences for dawdling or 
changing her mind. In variant play however, the 
system subverts the player’s control of the map, 
and forces her to engage the activity in the 
system’s terms. These terms are dynamically set 
by the system, as a moving target proceeds along a 
route, circumventing obstacles, and forcing the 
player to catch up. The laying of routes, which is 
normally exclusive to the player in sandbox play, is 
hijacked by the system. A different-coloured route 
is laid down on the map without the player’s input. 
The system’s red route is even signified to have 
higher priority relative to the player’s yellow route – 
the player is asked whether she wants to press a 
button to slave her yellow route to the objective 
moving along the red route. 
The moving target in variant play is a concentrated 
pool of resources. It represents an opportunity to 
either gain an unusual amount of PAG, or pass it 
up. If the player misses it, she will feel as if she has 
just lagged behind in the process of jointly 
constructing meaning with the design in 
conversation. This entails growing her capital of 
bio-costs for conversing with the game, and in 
RFG’s case involves developing the player-
character and evolving the gameworld by acquiring 
different kinds of resources, and becoming more 
skilled at the game. 
From the standpoint of the model, RFG sabotaging 
its own scheme of interactional support remedies 
the threat to agency from shifting between 
attentional footprints. It anticipates the shift, and 
gives the system an additional means of signaling 
the shift. Tokens (map icons and objects in the 
gameworld) no longer wait for the player. Controls 
that were exclusive to the player (route-laying) are 
made available to the system and wielded by the 
system. Without this degradation in tokens and 
controls, the player might only feel the shift in 
attentional footprint when she got close to the 
moving target from variant play. With the 
degradation, she can feel the shift no matter how 
 
Figure 4 | PAG becomes disconnected from tokens and controls. 
 
Figure 5 | Update to PAG in variant play is anticipated. 
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far she might be from the target when variant play 
becomes available. 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the terms for bio-cost 
(controls) and the storage of bio-cost (tokens) shift 
to signal a change in the sale of bio-costs (PAG) 
under negotiation in the contract. If only the sale 
changed, or changed without warning, the player 
would feel cheated; instead, the player is apprised 
of changes to the values that will add up to that 
sale. 
5 | CONCLUSION  
The model in this paper contains eight different 
levels of abstraction for how agency works as 
communication in videogames. The model is meant 
to provide a follow-through on certain currents in 
agency research. The levels – in what they are and 
how they work together – describe how the player 
uncovers the system as intent and how the system 
makes itself discoverable, from low-level to high-
level. The processes in the model – signaling of the 
attainability of understandings, investments of bio-
cost against assurances of returns – let the model 
meet the objectives (stated in the Introduction of 
this paper) of not seeing levels of communication 
as a sender and receiver dyad, as well as holding 
an integrated perspective of the system and the 
player in agency, and seeing agency as a 
conversation. 
The model is intended as an intermediate step 
between theory for the phenomenon of play and 
actionable design principles derived from that 
understanding. As mentioned in the Background 
section of this paper, the what is relatively well-
established, across different perspectives and 
approaches, including agency; this paper means to 
make a contribution to the how. 
The process of meaning-making that concerns the 
model in this paper is similar to what Carvalhais & 
Cardoso (2017) describe as the Virtuosic 
Interpretation that users of processor-based 
artifacts engage in. Of particular interest is the 
anxiety experienced by these users by having too 
few or too many possibilities, as determined by how 
much accuracy can be had in user mental models 
of the system. This matches the functioning of the 
model in this paper (with regards to bio-cost), as 
well as the definition of agency in Wardrip-Fruin et 
al. as “a phenomenon, involving both the game and 
the player, that occurs when the actions players 
desire are among those they can take as supported 
by an underlying computational model” (2009, p. 7). 
Carvalhais & Cardoso (2017) recommend exposing 
the computational-model in the artifacts themselves 
to account for Virtuosic Interpretation, and affirm 
the value of the iterative process in designing 
processor-based artifacts. An intermediate step – 
such as the how in the multiple levels of the model 
in this paper – is warranted. It will enable a broader 
set of design strategies for uncovering the 
underlying computational model, beyond outright 
exposing it in artifacts. The model can also guide 
iterative design. 
Future research following from the model in this 
paper includes empirical validation of the model’s 
predictive capabilities. The examples for how the 
model can be used to describe videogame design 
in this paper take two finished, published titles and 
frame their design in the model. These examples 
inform the argument for the model’s validity, which 
is made in the rest of the paper. In the examples, 
aspects of the design that can compromise agency 
from the standpoint of the model are described, as 
well as aspects which prevent that harm to agency. 
Future research will instead look to unfinished 
designs in ongoing videogame development 
projects. The model already provides an integrated 
videogame-specific second-order perspective of the 
phenomenon of play; that is, what happens in play 
outside of explicit activity as well as inside explicit 
activity. In an unfinished, ongoing iterative design 
process, the model would yield design rules and 
even patterns. This will be done iteratively. The 
model will be applied in detecting potential design 
problems before they emerge in playtesting. Should 
the predictions be confirmed in playtesting, the 
model will have to be used to determine solutions 
for those design problems, to be evaluated in 
subsequent iterations and playtesting. Otherwise, 
the application of the model will have to be re-
factored, until predictions of the design problem 
and the corresponding solution are achieved. 
Further subsequent research in the model lies with 
design tools and vocabularies – using the model to 
encapsulate a wide variety of problem-solution 
pairs in videogame design, or to derive actionable 
design principles, or redefine existing principles. 
Empirical testing of predictive capabilities requires 




design problem in particular levels in the model, 
and doing the same for a solution. The next step 
would be to create novel videogames entirely from 
the model, to test and illustrate design principles. 
This would be a move from loose design rules from 
ongoing projects, to comprehensive pattern 
collections, tools, and vocabularies, from fresh 
projects.  
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